Visit of Members of the Tanzanian-German Centre for Eastern African Legal Studies to the South African-German Centre for Transnational Criminal Justice

On Monday, 12 September 2016, members of the Tanzanian-German Centre for Eastern African Legal Studies visited the South African-German Centre for Transnational Criminal Justice at the Faculty of Law Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. With a delegation of 19 participants comprising the project manager, project assistant, student assistant, a PhD candidate and fifteen LLM students, the group was received by the course coordinator and three PhD candidates of the South African-German Centre.


The deliberations started with a short introduction of the participants and a general overview of their research projects. The LLM students of the Tanzanian-German Centre presented their research, due to the fact that they were at the final stages, an analysis of their individual thesis  and a summary of their findings was communicated  to the group. This brought up a variety of interesting issues in the various fields of their research including, amongst others, international criminal law, human rights and good governance, economic aspects of regional integration and refugee law in the East African context.






Additionally, the doctoral candidates of the South African-German Centre also had the opportunity to provide an overview of their research in the area of international criminal law and transitional justice, the progress of their research and the outlook for its conclusion. Each doctoral candidate presented an analysis of selected important issues of their research dealing with the relation of the International Criminal Court and Palestine, the role of transnational terrorism in international criminal law and an evaluation of the Red Terror Trials in Ethiopia in the context of the prosecution of politicide. Consequently, this led to a period of intense question and answer, particularly on some of the more controversial issues in their research areas and some of the issues raised in the presentations.

The official discussions ended on a very high note and many of the participants continued private discussions on some of the contentious issues after the deliberations were officially closed.

An Opinion Piece on South Africa’s Withdrawal from the ICC by Victoria Ojo and Seada H Adem

On October 19 2016, South Africa formally began the process to withdraw from the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. The instrument of withdrawal signed by the minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, was submitted to the Secretariat of the United Nations following a decision by the South African cabinet. According to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, the obligations of South Africa under the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC Act are ‘incompatible’ with its obligations under the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act as was held in the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Omar al Bashir case. It is as a result of this alleged conflict that the cabinet made the decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute. The Supreme Court of Appeal previously reached the decision that the obligations under the Rome Statute should take precedence over the international law norm of diplomatic immunities. The government has challenged this decision at the Constitutional Court and the case was set to be heard in November, the minister however revealed that the appeal will be withdrawn. The opposition party Democratic Alliance (DA) termed the action regressive and contrary to the duty of the State to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.
Since the intention to withdraw from the ICC was announced, various media, scholars and blogs have debated the justification behind the withdrawal and its repercussions on the ICC and international criminal justice. On the other hand, very little has been said about the recent self-referral of Gabon to the ICC. It appears that the coincidental reminder of Gabon’s self-referral—that the ICC’s alleged ‘targeting of Africa’ was mainly the result of African states’ referral of their own situations to the ICC—was not taken note of. It also appears that the constantly evolving nature of international criminal law in particular as well as the relative novelty of the Court and its practices was ignored in many of the comments given.
International criminal justice has been developing for centuries. The ICC, though one of the greatest achievements in light of the fight against impunity, has experienced many setbacks. The al-Bashir case, the Kenyatta et al and the 2009 Palestine decision, among others, have given rise to much controversy. One could raise various instances on what and how situations and cases could have been better selected, prioritized and handled within the Court. However, considering its overarching goal of providing redress to the victims of gross human rights violations and its watchdog function in the absence of domestic and regional redresses, the antagonistic stance of various critics of the Court is astounding. Despite the agenda and discourse advocated, the fact of the matter is that, as a court of last resort, it is an institution looking after the need for justice of the helpless many. Leaving aside some African leaders’ need to shield themselves from prosecution and the technicality of the law, the issue that comes to mind is whether (as claimed by the South African minister), membership to the Rome Statute affects the establishment of peace. If so, what does leaving the institution achieve?
South Africa is one of the African countries that played a leading role in the development of the ICC and also the first African country to have passed domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute. The reaction of the President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute is that the action of South Africa is a ‘disturbing signal that could open the way for other states to withdraw from the ICC which would weaken the only international institution dealing with the most serious crimes of international concern’. This opinion is shared by many who fear that South Africa’s move would create a domino effect resulting in more African states withdrawing from the ICC. At the moment, Namibia and consequently Gambia have also announced their intention to withdraw. If more states follow suit, this would be unsettling to many African people who would be left with no international option to hold perpetrators at the upper echelon of power responsible.
It is no secret that in recent years, the African Union has become critical of the ICC and its operations. Particularly with regards to the provisions of the Article 27 of the Rome Statute on the irrelevance of official capacity, which directly erodes the principle of diplomatic immunity for heads of government and senior government officials including those non-member states before the Court through Security Council referrals. Even though not all AU member States are members of the ICC, Africa constitutes the largest regional bloc in the Court’s membership. Currently, the majority of ongoing cases and investigations are on the African continent, which one may expect as Africa is the largest regional bloc in the Court. While the number of investigations on Africa cannot, on its own, be an indication of bias, it has been used by the anti-ICC crusaders in their analysis. It is important to note however that not all AU member states are anti-ICC as countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra-Leone, Tunisia, Senegal and Malawi have indicated their support for the Court and Gabon has recently made a self-referral. The government of Botswana has also stated that the withdrawal of South Africa is ‘regrettable’. It further ‘reaffirmed its membership’ of the Rome Statute and ‘reiterated its support for a strong international criminal justice system through the ICC’.
South Africa’s notice of withdrawal was made by the executive branch of the South African government without consulting the parliament and its people. Although some voices doubt the constitutionality of the move, this does not affect the validity and the effectiveness of the notice of withdrawal. With regards to the stated justification for the withdrawal on the incompatibility of South Africa’s obligations to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa, though not significantly developed, the ICC has means for improvement through Article 53 of the Statute, namely ‘interests of justice’. The latter allows the Prosecutor to suspend investigations when an intervention by the Court jeopardizes peace talks. Although the Prosecutor needs to make more use of this ‘criterion’ in her decision to proceed to investigations, South Africa’s notice for withdrawal mainly based on the ‘incompatible to peace settlements’ claim makes the notice drastic and abrupt .
The 2014 Malabo Protocol which confers a criminal jurisdiction on the African Court has been touted as the African alternative to the ICC. However, it has so far not been ratified by any country and it requires 15 ratifications to come into effect. One may hope the African Court will come into existence as an African solution to an African problem had it not been for Article 46 (A) bis of the Protocol which makes those in power immune from prosecution. As much as we would like the African Court to become a reality despite its flaws, we would also like to see the ICC address its limitations and subsist as a court of last resort.
The ICC is a permanent court that will, similar to any other institution see its heydays and doomsdays. The withdrawal of South Africa or any African state that may follow may not be one of its peaks but it would not be the end of the ICC. It however calls in question the credibility and reputation of those state agents who are withdrawing. What is yet cynical is the withdrawing states will still be open to the undemocratic Security Council referrals that in the first place contributed to the Africa vs. ICC debate. Conversely, withdrawing states do not have a duty to cooperate with the Court once the withdrawal takes effect. However, if those leaders do not want to be ‘targeted’ by the Court, their first line of defense should be desisting from committing gross human right violations.
Whether or not the action of South Africa will lead to a rush of withdrawal of African States from the ICC remains to be seen. However, it is obvious that this is a regrettable decision and it does not portend well for the future of justice and the fight against impunity on the African continent.

South Africa & the Domestication Question: A Commentary on the ICC Denunciation

South Africa & the Domestication Question: A commentary on the ICC denunciation

 By Matsiko Samuel

A conversation on the withdrawal of African states from the International Criminal Court and its impact on States Parties that have domesticated the Rome Statute is way overdue. The domestication question is a hitherto unexplored but important issue. Let’s take a hypothetical scenario where an African state has ratified the Rome Statute and domesticated the statute into national law through an act of parliament. Then the executive withdraws from the treaty without repealing the act through parliament. Such a  hypothetical scenario raises very important questions for academic debate:


  • What is the legality of the act at the time of withdraw?
  • How would a domestic court that has a pending case that relates to the act deal with such a case?
  • How would the courts address issues of cooperation with regard to a domestic law that provides for cooperation in terms of arrest and surrender to an institution established by the treaty in question?



Such questions are specific to the recent withdrawal of South Africa from the ICC. On 19th October 2016, the executive branch of the South African government exercised its “prerogative” powers to withdraw from the International Criminal Court. South Africa ratified the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998 and took further steps to domesticate the treaty into national legislation. South Africa’s parliament drafted the implementation of the Rome Statute which became law on 16 August 2002.

The preamble of the act provides that South Africa is committed to- bringing persons who commit such atrocities to justice, either in a court of law of the Republic in terms of its domestic laws where possible,pursuant to its international obligations to do so when the Republic became party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. There is no doubt that the exit from the ICC was sparked by the South Africa’s failure to arrest Sudan president Omar Bashir a head of state in June 2015 wanted for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in contravention of its commitments and obligations. The domestication question attempts to interrogate as to whether the withdraw of South Africa from the ICC without public or legislative involvement is fundamentally and procedurally flawed?

In addressing the questions and mapping of state practice in international law, it is settled that when a treaty is domesticated in a non-monist state it gets a life of its own separate and distinct from the treaty. Thus the domestic law is applicable until a legislative process to repeal the law has occurred. A plausible  example of an attempted legislative process to repeal a domestic law inspired by a treaty is the so called Brexit United Kingdom Great Repeal bill of 2016. The bill attempts to end European Union law enshrined in the1972 European Communities Act and trigger article 50 of the Lisbon treaty. Back to South Africa, despite the fact that the Rome Statute provides that the withdraw notice shall take effect one year after deposit. It is without doubt that until a process to repeal the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 is finalised South Africa is still obliged to fulfil its commitments. This will create a legal and political paradox for South Africa on the 22nd day of November 2016. The South African Constitutional Court in addressing the Bashir case will be put to test to either cooperate with ICC on the arrest and surrender as enshrined in section 8 of the International Criminal Court act or succumb to the effects ofrealpolitik” in addressing the nascent and yet unsettled field of International Criminal Law.

In a nutshell, accountability for international atrocity crimes and human rights violations in a not so perfect international criminal justice system ought to be  the dominant script of any international criminal justice system. In the spirit of the African group for justice and accountability i believe that the pessimistic argument that justice not being served elsewhere (the west) should not be served anywhere (Africa) is fundamentally flawed and merely diversionary. Inspired by the words of Atonnio Cassese better to have half a loaf than simply pie in the sky.

The al-Mahdi Case: Breaking New Grounds

In one of the groundbreaking war crime cases before the International Criminal Court a member of Ansar Eddine, an extremist group linked to Al-Qaeda, has pleaded guilty to the destruction of cultural heritages. Mr Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi is charged with ‘intentionally directing attacks’ against nine ancient shrines and a mosque in Mali after the extremist group captured the Malian city of Timbuktu and other parts of Mali in 2012. The case is a result of a self-referral made in July 2012 by the Malian government, which ratified the ICC Statute in 2000.

After the Court issued an arrest warrant on 18 September 2015, al-Mahdi was arrested and surrendered to the Court through the cooperation of African States, namely Niger and Mali. On 24 March 2016, the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the Court confirmed the war crime charge and found the evidence presented by the prosecutor sufficient to establish substantial ground to believe that al-Mahdi is criminally responsible for the alleged crimes.

The al-Mahdi case has given rise to new precedents. It is for the first time that destruction of historical and religious monuments constituted a single war crime charge against an accused before the ICC. Furthermore, it is also the first charge against an Islamic extremist, and a first for any accused of the Court to plead guilty. Standing before the Court, on 22 August 2016, al-Mahdi admitted all charges against him as ‘accurate and correct’ and asked forgiveness from the people of Timbuktu. ‘I am really remorseful, and I regret all the damage that my actions have caused,’ he stated.

The availability of vast and compelling evidence against al-Mahdi and his admission of guilt makes the trial the most expeditious and economically efficient trial before the Court.  Considering that the al-Mahdi case is the first case from the situation in Mali, al-Mahdi’s key position in Ansar Eddine and his admission of guilt, he could also be a useful resource regarding the prosecution of other crimes allegedly committed in Mali.

This seems even more important since the destruction of cultural heritages has now become a core feature of modern warfare as witnessed in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. In light of this trend, the Court has also made a strong statement on the seriousness of war crimes against cultural heritages. Although prosecution and conviction of al-Mahdi may not totally deter the waves of deliberate destructions of historical and religious monuments, the trial still sets a historical precedent and forces other perpetrators to make some value judgment.

More significantly, the prosecution of al-Mahdi has pointed the international community to a better way of dealing with extremists. As former prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo stated, the fight against terrorism would be ‘more effective and humane’ if we deal with terrorists as criminals than as enemies.

The Court is expected to render its judgment and sentence on the al-Mahdi case on 27 September 2016.

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